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Abstract 
Improvement in the EU gas transmission network between 2009 and 2014 
The report compares the European gas infrastructure between 2009 and 2014 to demonstrate how Reg. (EC) 
994/2010 has promoted and reinforced security of gas supply. Infrastructure improvements and results of a 
country-based simulation model analysing a Ukrainian and a Russian shortage of gas are presented. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Policy context 
On 28 May 2014 the European Commission adopted the “European Energy Security 
Strategy” (COM/2014/0330 final) providing a comprehensive proposal to strengthen the 
security of energy supply in Europe. In its plan for an “Energy Union” (COM/2015/080 
final), launched early in 2015, the European Commission identifies as one of the five 
strategic dimensions “Energy security, solidarity and trust” and proposes – among other 
tools - the development of a clear common strategy for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and 
natural gas storage within a fully developed European Energy Market. 
In this context, Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and its on-going revision plays an overarching 
role in the security of gas supply and in strengthening regional cooperation in case of 
crisis. 
This short report aims at providing a first assessment of the improvements put in place 
by Member States and Transmission System Operators in the area of infrastructure after 
the enactment of Regulation (EU) 994/2010. This is a robust and sound quantitative 
analysis of the changes in the European infrastructure between 2009 and 2014 which 
complements the Commission Staff Working Document “Report on the implementation of 
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and its contribution to solidarity and preparedness for gas 
disruptions in the EU” (SWD(2014) 325 final). 
The report outlines a description of the changes in the national infrastructure of Member 
States by focusing on LNG terminals, underground gas storage (UGS) facilities and 
cross-border interconnection points. A holistic assessment of the performance of the 
European transmission grid is carried out using the “Gas EMergency FLOW” simulator 
model (GEMFLOW) for different crisis scenarios. 
 
Key conclusions 
 The analysis shows how Regulation (EU) 994/2010 on security of supply and the 
third package of legislative proposals for electricity and gas markets have 
provided an effective legislative framework to increase the resilience of the EU 
gas grid to supply shocks. 
 The EU gas infrastructure still needs some strategic investments to eliminate the 
isolation of some Member States and increase the interconnection level of others. 
 
Main findings 
 Relevant investments, pushed forwards by many TSOs and strategically 
supported by the European Commission with “Projects of Common Interest”, have 
created the conditions to boost the technical capacities of the gas grid to transfer 
more easily natural gas among Member States. 
 The number of LNG terminals has increased by four units since 2009 and the 
nominal annual aggregated send-out capacity increased by 41% from 134 to 189 
Bcm per year. 
 The number of UGS facilities and the working storage capacity have increased 
between 2009 and 2014 11% and 21% respectively, with a total of 143 sites and 
a capacity of 100 Bcm. 
 Reverse flow has been substantially implemented within the EU as the number of 
interconnection points with this capability has increased from 24% in 2009 to 
40% in 2014. 
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 Along with the implementation of physical bi-directional capacity among MS, the 
overall cross-border capacity of the EU high pressure grid (between MS and with 
neighbouring countries) has improved as a whole by 10,6% from 2.997,4 Mcm/d 
to 3.315,0 Mcm/d between 2009 and 2014. 
 Some relevant bottlenecks still exist in the EU grid (e.g., the South-East corridor, 
interconnections between France and Spain or France and Germany and Belgium) 
and some member States are poorly or not connected to the main EU system 
(e.g., the Baltic Region and Finland, Croatia, Bulgaria and Greece). 
 The improvements realised by 2014 have considerably increased the resilience of 
the European grid to react to supply shocks and, in particular, for those Member 
States which still suffer from a very low supply diversification. In general the 
simulated crisis scenarios between 2009 and 2014 show how volumes of 
unserved gas decrease and first day of crisis is postponed. 
 
Related and future JRC work 
The need of flexible and reliable tools to explore and assess the impact of further 
developments in the infrastructure and of future policies on security of supply in the field 
of natural gas has prompted the Institute of Energy and Transport of the Joint Research 
Centre to continue developing GEMFLOW and to complete the EUGas project (i.e., a full 
hydraulic model of the gas transport network of the European Union). 
 
Quick guide  
The report analyses the improvements in the EU natural gas transmission network since 
the major supply crisis of 2009. Overall the network has made strategic enhancements 
in underground storage capacity, LNG facilities and capability of moving gas among 
Member States through interconnection points. Supply shocks comparable to the 2009 
crisis are evaluated using a simulation model. Results show how volumes of unserved 
gas decrease and the beginning of a national crisis is substantially delayed. Both come 
as positive outcomes of the network improvements. Regulation (EC) 994/2010 on 
security of supply has been one of the main drivers of the increased ability of Europe to 
cope with gas crisis. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 concerning measures to safeguard security of gas supply was 
enacted following the 2009 natural gas crisis, which showed important weaknesses of 
the European high pressure transmission system. It repealed Council Directive 
2004/67/EC [1] on measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply by providing a 
consistent framework to carry out a full risk assessment of national grids, identifying 
tools and criteria to improve performance and resilience, and providing means to 
increase preparedness and skills to cope with crises. The lessons learnt from the 
implementation of Directive 2004/67/EC had shown that it was necessary to harmonize 
national measures in order to ensure that all Member States are prepared at least on a 
common minimum level. It was felt that, if all Member States were to comply with a set 
of minimum standards, this would enhance solidarity between them in case of crisis, 
since no one could be seen "to take a free ride" on the efforts made by others. At the 
same time, the legislator considered that excessive protection of own gas consumers in 
some Member States could leave consumers in other Member States more exposed 
and/or could disproportionally restrict trade. 
During the 2009 gas supply crisis the necessary amounts of gas were available in the 
European Union (EU) internal market but it was physically impossible to ship them to the 
most affected Member States in Eastern Europe. Against this background, Regulation 
(EU) 994/2010 [2] aims to improve cross-border capacities by pursuing the development 
of new infrastructures, or upgrading the existing ones, which is essential in terms of 
security of supply. The two tools chosen are the Infrastructure Standard (the so-called 
N-1 rule) and the implementation of permanent bi-directional capacity (physical "reverse 
flows") in cross border points [3]. 
On 28 May 2014 the Commission adopted its European Energy Security Strategy 
providing a comprehensive plan to strengthen the security of energy supply in Europe 
[4]. A common European strategy, along with a common European Energy Market – as it 
has been reinforced by the enactment by the European Commission (EC) of the third 
package of legislative proposals for electricity and gas markets1 - is more and more a 
fundamental need for the European Union in light of the role played by natural gas in the 
European energy mix, as the share of natural gas in the European final energy 
consumption is still slowly increasing, moving from 21,9% in 2009 to 22,9% in 20132. In 
its plan for an “Energy Union” [5], launched early in 2015, the European Commission 
foresees – among others tools - the need of a clear common strategy for LNG and 
natural gas storage. This strategy looks at the long term role of LNG and gas storage in 
ensuring a secure, affordable and sustainable EU energy system and identifies what 
further action may be needed in those areas in the future. 
 
                                           
1  The European Commission has adopted on 21 September 2009: Directive 
2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive 2003/54/EC; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009 
on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for 
access to the natural gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 
1775/2005; Regulation (EC) No 713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 13 July 2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators. 
2 Data from calculation on EUROSTAT indicator “Final energy consumption by product” 
(ten00095). 
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Furthermore, to meet the ambitious targets of the 2020 Climate and Energy Package3 
[6] and live up to the objectives of the 2030 Framework for Climate and Energy Policies 
[7] (i.e., the European Council endorsed a binding EU target of at least 40% domestic 
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 compared to 1990), greater investments 
in the energy infrastructure will be required in the near future in all the sectors that 
make up Europe's energy market. New investments in energy infrastructure across the 
Union are also instrumental in ensuring an integrated and efficient internal energy 
market and security of energy supply. 
Since 2009 the effects of the energy policy of the European Commission have laid down 
the basis for a more mature energy market and a more flexible and secure natural gas 
market. But still Europe suffers of strong import dependence for natural gas, which is 
weakening its position at the international level. This is why more efforts should be made 
in the same directions of the achievements of the last five years. In particular with the 
new European Energy Security Strategy, the European Commission underlines again 
areas of further development and addresses the medium- and long-term security of 
supply challenges. The Commission proposes actions in several key areas:  
 completing the internal energy market and building missing infrastructure links 
are essential to quickly respond to possible supply disruptions by directing energy 
flows across the EU as and where needed; 
 diversifying supplier countries and routes, e.g. in the Caspian Basin region by 
further expanding the Southern Gas Corridor; by developing the Mediterranean 
Gas Hub and by increasing LNG supplies; 
 strengthening emergency and solidarity mechanisms by reviewing the provisions 
and implementation of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation; 
 improving the coordination of national energy policies and speaking with one 
voice in external energy policy. 
With this short report we aim at providing a first analysis of the improvements put in 
place by Member States and Transmission System Operators after the enactment of 
Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and their effects. Firstly, we provide a description of the 
changes in the national infrastructure, and then we perform a comparison of the 
behaviour of the European transmission grid under two crisis scenarios for 2009 and 
2014 by using the “Gas EMergency FLOW” [8, 9] simulator model (GEMFLOW). 
  
                                           
3 The 2020 Climate and Energy Package sets three key objectives: (i) 20% reduction 
in EU greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels; (ii) raising the share of EU energy 
consumption produced from renewable resources to 20%; (iii) a 20% improvement in 
the EU's energy efficiency. 
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2. CHANGES IN THE EU GAS INFRASTRUCTURE BETWEEN 2009 AND 
2014 
Understanding and assessing how investments in infrastructure and the impact of new 
legislation – like Regulation (EU) 994/2010 – have improved the European natural gas 
high pressure network is a challenging research task. On one side we face the analysis of 
a complex dynamical system designed to transport and distribute natural gas in multiple 
countries. On the other, the “natural gas business” [10] has undergone relevant changes 
in a more general context of economic difficulties. We provide here some general 
remarks and in the following sections of this chapter we perform a comparison of the 
status of four strategic areas of the EU natural gas system (i.e., LNG facilities, UGS 
facilities, cross-border capacity and physical reverse flow) between 2009 and 2014 to 
start to shade light on this research topic. 
We avoid presenting any result concerning how the liquidity of the natural gas market 
has changed and how the value chain has been transformed along with the general 
business model, though we recognize the relevance of such topics for a mature and well-
shaped Energy Union. Our major focus is here on improvements of the physical 
infrastructure and its ability to better provide the commodity within Europe. For this, we 
prefer to move forward to a simple comparison of two key indicators of the structure of 
the high pressure grid of any Member State (MS) - like the total length of the grid and 
the total compressor power installed - to offer a more complete picture of the complex 
interaction and feedbacks among the components of the integrated European gas grid. 
The total length of the grid provides an idea of how investments were translated into a 
better connection from sources to customers to increase volumes, distribution and 
generally the resilience of the network. The total compressor power installed gives an 
indication of increased capacity and commitment in improving directional flows. The 
general overview given in Table 1 shows how, with some remarkable differences 
between MS, the EU high pressure grid has grown to better address issues related to 
increased interconnectivity (within and between MS) and volumes (i.e., higher total 
installed compressor power). The role of some MS (like Germany and the Netherlands) 
as pivotal elements in the grid (along with the role of users of the commodity) is marked 
by the changes in the two indicators. Other MS (in particular from Eastern Europe) show 
less relevant improvements generally linked to a minor role as key players (e.g., the 
Baltic Region and the Southern-East corridor). 
Additionally, we have avoided assessing the effects of the application of the Regulation 
(EC) No. 715/2009 [11]. In order to enhance market transparency, under the 
coordination of the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas 
(ENTSOG), the transmission network operators have facilitated access to information 
provided to network users and market participants through the implementation of a 
common standardized format for publication of the required data in compliance with 
Chapter 1 of Annex 1 of the Reg. (EC) 715/2009. TSOs have to publish information 
regarding the services they offer and the relevant conditions applied, together with the 
technical, tariff and operational information necessary for network users to gain effective 
network access. ENTSOG has supported the efforts of EU TSOs by creating an ad hoc 
web-based platform for transparency4 and data dissemination. But still TSOs have to 
overcome a fear in providing a complete and rich collection of information to the public, 
since the requirements of Reg. (EC) 715/2009 were formally met by only 86% as it has 
been underlined by a recent report on the topic by the Agency for the Cooperation of 
Energy Regulators (ACER) [12]. Some major areas of improvement for ACER still are: 
providing information “near real-time” of actual physical flows; providing historical 
information on capacities, nominations, interruptions, physical flows; providing 
measured values of the gross calorific value or Wobble index. It is our opinion that even 
the description of the network, though formally met by almost all TSOs, shows a high 
                                           
4 Available at https://transparency.entsog.eu/  
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heterogeneity in the level of detail, which hampers the understanding of any change in 
the grid. 
Annex 1 provides an overview for all Member States of the type of information available 
through the transparency platform developed by TSOs. 
  
8 
 
Table 1. Total length of high pressure transmission and transit systems and total power 
of compressor stations by Member States in 2010 and 2014 [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. 
 
 
Total length (km) 
 Total installed power 
in Compressor 
Stations (MW) 
 2010 2014 % ’14 –‘10  2010 2014 % ’14 –‘10 
Austria 1600* 1600   551 621 13% 
Belgium 3900 4100 5%  116 116*  
Bulgaria 2645 2645   263 263  
Croatia 2085 2662 28%  - -  
Czech Republic 3643 3813 5%  297 297  
Denmark 800 953 19%  - 18,3 + 
Estonia 877 885 1%  - -  
Finland 1186 1314 11%  63 64 2% 
France 36617 37156 2%  643 636 -1% 
Germany5 31515 38125 21%  1679 2542 51% 
Greece 1218 1291 6%  - 13 + 
Hungary 5564 5784 4%  188 233 24% 
Ireland6 2004 2055 3%  94 94  
Italy 33584 34415 3%  857 867 1% 
Latvia 1281 1240 -3%  - -  
Lithuania 1865 2007 8%  42 42  
Luxemburg 410,7 412,7 1%  - -  
Poland7 9777 10077 3%  150 156 4% 
Portugal 1299 1374 6%  - -  
Romania 13110 13138 0,2%  30 32 7% 
Slovakia 2270 2367 4%  700* 700  
Slovenia 1018 1094 8%  16 16  
Spain 9984 10512 5%  413 525,9 27% 
Sweden 620 620   - -  
the Netherlands 11650 15500 33%  734 808 10% 
United Kingdom 7880 7891 0,1%  1611 1611*  
* The value has been assumed equal to the other reference year for lack of publicly available 
information. 
- No compressor station exists. 
+ New compressor station after 2009. 
(Source: JRC analysis on Southern Corridor GRIP 2014-2023, Central Eastern Europe GRIP 2014-2023, Baltic 
Energy Market Interconnection Plan GRIP 2014-2023, ENTSOG TYDP 2011-2012, ENTSOG TYNDP 2015 and from 
data provided on their home pages by the TSOs REN, Enagás, GRTgaz TIGF, Energinet.DK, Swedegas, Gasum, 
National Grid, Gaslink, Gaz-System, Gasunie Transport Services B.V.) 
  
                                           
5 It is important to note that the value for Germany in 2010 is partial as not all 
German TSOs were collaborating in providing data for the “Country profile” of the TYNDP 
2011-2020. 
6  Only onshore pipelines are considered as provided by the “Gaslink Performance 
Report” for 2010 and 2013. 
7 Figures are excluding the data concerning the transit line from Belarus to Germany 
with a total of 684 km of length and five compressor stations with a total installed power 
of 400 MW.  
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2.1 LNG FACILITIES 
The European LNG market has been characterized by a substantial reduction since 2011 
(Figure 1) due to a combination of factors like a general decrease in demand linked to 
weather conditions, the economic crisis, competition with other markets (mainly the far 
East markets), cheaper prices for natural gas from pipelines (with Russian origin in the 
first place), and competition with other fuels in the power generation sector. Demand in 
Europe fell to 34,3 Bcm of LNG in 2014 [18], accounting for a 8,5% reduction compared 
to 2013. This is the third year of a decline in LNG demand and the overall demand is 
43,3% lower than in 2009.  
This current market contraction is not reflected in the strategic role of LNG in the EU 
policy. The recent adoption of the "European Energy Security Strategy" [4] pointed to a 
strong dependence of the EU on a single external supplier (i.e., Russia) and identified 
LNG as a relevant tool for diversification. Along with this argument LNG has been 
identified as one of the most efficient answers to short-term crises or shocks, together 
with the use of UGS [19]. 
The evolution of the LNG sector in the EU is summarized in Table 1 for all that concerns 
the main features of the facilities operating in Europe. The number of regasification 
plants has increased by four units, from 17 in 2009 to 21 in 2014, after the coming into 
operation of two Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRU; one in Italy and one in 
Lithuania) and two on-shore plants (one in the Netherlands and one in France) (Figure 
2). The nominal annual aggregated send-out capacity increased by 41% from 134 to 189 
Bcm per year, as a combination of the new facilities and the upgrading of existing 
facilities (e.g., the United Kingdom showed an increase of 64,5%, Figure 2 and Table 1). 
The maximum daily aggregated send-out capacity has further increased from 483,5 to 
616,5 Mcm per day, so providing an extra 27,5% capacity over five years (Figure 2). 
Spain and the United Kingdom play a major role in the EU as LNG hubs, both in terms of 
infrastructure and in terms of imports (29,6% and 30,9% respectively of the total import 
in Europe in 2014). But the capacity of transfer natural gas from those hubs to the rest 
of Europe is constrained by multiple factors as, for instance, a cheaper price of pipelines 
imports from Eastern Europe and a peripheral position respect Central-Eastern European 
Member States. 
 
 
Figure 1. Evolution of LNG imports – net of re-exports - in EU from 2009 to 2014 in 
billion cubic meters of liquefied natural gas in gaseous form (Source: GIILNG [18]). 
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Table 2. Total number of LNG facilities, nominal annual aggregated capacity and 
maximum daily aggregated send-out capacity by Member State in EU in 2009 and 2014 
(Source: [20, 21]). 
 Number of 
facilities 
 Nominal annual aggregated 
capacity (Bcm/y) 
 Maximum daily aggregated 
send-out capacity (Mcm/d) 
 
2009 2014 
 
2009 2014 
Change 
2014-
2009 
Percent 
change 
2014-
2009 
 
2009 2014 
Change 
2014-
2009 
Percent 
change 
2014-
2009 
Belgium 1 1  9 9    40,8 40,8   
Greece 1 1  5,3 5,3    17,6 17,6   
Lithuania - 1  - 4 4 +  - 11 11 + 
Netherlands - 1  - 12 12 +  - 39,6 39,6 + 
Portugal 1 1  5,5 7,9 2,4 43,6  21,6 32,4 10,8 50 
France 2 3  17 23,8 6,8 40  66 93,8 27,8 42,1 
Italy 2 3  11 14,7 3,7 34,7  36,9 50,9 14 37,9 
United 
Kingdom 
4 4 
 
31,8 52,3 20,5 64,5 
 
141,8 165,6 23,8 16,8 
Spain 6 6  54,4 60,1 5,7 10,5  158,7 164,7 6 3,8 
Total EU 17 21  134,0 189,1 55,1 41,1  483,4 616,4 133 27,5 
- No LNG terminal exists. 
+ New LNG terminal after 2009. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Total number of LNG facilities 
(A), nominal annual aggregated capacity 
(B) and maximum daily aggregated send-
out capacity (C) by Member State in EU in 
2009 and 2014 (Source: [20, 21]). 
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2.2 UNDERGROUND STORAGE 
Underground gas storage facilities (UGS), together with increased scope for reverse 
flows, can play a key role as a tool to balance the supply-demand situation in the event 
of supply disruption in the EU [4]. An UGS can act as a buffer in case of a disruption of 
gas deliveries, but the volume availability of natural gas depends on storage level 
inventories and the withdrawal rate with which gas can be delivered to the consumers. 
According to GSE there were 143 UGS facilities in the European Union in 2014, with an 
increase of 11% since 2009, comprising a combined capacity of 100 Bcm (an increase of 
21% since 2009) (Table 3). Though the majority of the facilities and the greatest share 
of working gas are in Central-Western Europe (i.e., Germany, Italy and France, Figure 
3.A and Figure 3.B), the ratio gas consumption/storage capacity is similarly spread 
across the EU with some exceptions such as Austria and Latvia, whose storage capacity 
exceeds consumption. 
Since 2006 the general improvements in storage have been driven by the need to 
address the decrease of European production, to cope with an increasing consumption 
(whose trend has changed after 2008), to provide flexibility to the market, as well as the 
opportunity to take advantage of price volatility of the newly liberalised markets. 
Furthermore, some difficulties of accessing existing storage, booked through long term 
contracts, may have also played a role [22]. But it appears that the role of measures 
aimed at strengthening security of supply (e.g., storage obligations) has been marginal. 
By comparing 2009 and 2014, the EU shows a marked increase in withdrawal capacity 
(23,5% up to 2.030,2 Mcm/d and an additional 117,6 Mcm/d proposed with new 
projects) and total injection capacity (33,3% up to 1.122,3 Mcm/d and an additional 
41,8 Mcm/d proposed with new projects), with approximately three quarters of the 
facilities providing access through a negotiated regime (Table 3). Withdrawal capacity is 
unevenly distributed among MS, with the Netherlands, Italy and Latvia showing the 
higher average levels (Figure 3.C).  
However, the business model for filling gas storages is not necessarily setting incentives 
to store gas to prevent crisis situations. Gas storages are being filled on the basis of 
price spreads between summer and winter time, and the recent inventory dynamics 
show a certain level of variability (Figure 4). Analysis of such spreads, based on historic 
events, does not help predicting unexpected events [22]. Moreover the price spread 
between winter time and summer time has been decreasing over the last years. In 
general the value of storage has been undermined by the decreasing spreads and 
volatility, due to a combination of factors such as excess of supply in Europe and 
competition with other sources of flexibility (i.e., new interconnectors or improvements 
in capacity for existing interconnectors, and short-term contracts or spot LNG gas) and 
increasing storage-to-storage competition. 
In addition the recent communication on the preparedness for a possible disruption of 
supplies from the East during the fall and winter of 2014/2015 (COM(2014) 654 final) 
[19] has showed that the way MS address the use of storages may hide important risks 
for the security of supply in the medium term. If countries rely on a short term increase 
in withdrawal rates (unless measures are taken subsequently to avoid emptying storages 
too rapidly), they may face the repercussions later in case a disruption or problems 
endure, including that withdrawal rates at low storage levels decrease substantially. 
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Table 3. Number of UGS facilities in EU classified by type, aggregated working volume, 
total withdrawal capacity, total injection capacity (plus extension of operational 
facilities) and access regime for 2009 (upper table) and 2014 (lower table) [23, 24, 25, 
26]. 
 
 
Source: JRC analysis on GSE maps for 2009 and 2014, and from LBEG 2010, 2013 
 
YEAR:    2009 By type:
Depleted
Field
Acquifer
Salt
Cavity
Other operating extension operating extension operating extension regulated negotiated
Austria 5 5 4230 1200 48,88 40,48 5
Belgium 1 1 625 75 12,00 3 6,00 1,8 1
Bulgaria 1 1 350 3,30 3,00 1
Croatia 1 1 553 5,76 3,84 1
Czech Republic 8 6 1 1 3077 50,70 36,25 6
Denmark 2 1 1 1001 15,70 6,50 2
France 15 12 3 12255 1250 328,50 150,00 15
Germany 49 14 10 24 1 20804 3227 509,86 236,63 49
Hungary 5 5 3720 600 51,00 6,8 25,87 4 5
Ireland 1 1 218 2,50 1,70
Italy 10 10 14335 2002 253,00 132,70 10
Latvia 1 1 2320 24,00 16,80
Poland 6 5 1 1575 950 33,80 18,69
Portugal 1 1 150 30 7,00 7 2,50 2,5
Romania 8 8 2694 750 25,07 31,07 8
Slovakia 2 2 2750 34,35 28,85 2
Spain 3 3 2775 846 14,80 11,6 9,60 7,9 3
Sweden 1 1 10 0,60 0,49
The Netherlands 4 3 1 5000 146,00 39,60 2
UK 5 3 2 4051 30 77,62 0 51,52 0 1 1
EU 129    62       31     33        3    82.493,0    10.960,0  1.644,4 28,4     842,1   16,2     30           82         
Number of facilities Working Gas 
(Mcm)
Withdrawal 
Capacity
(Mcm/d)
 Injection Capacity
(Mcm/d) 
Access regime
Total
YEAR:    2014 By type:
Depleted
Field
Acquifer
Salt
Cavity
Other operating extension operating extension operating extension regulated negotiated
Austria 9 9 8166 94,38 76,06 9
Belgium 1 1 700 15,00 7,80 1
Bulgaria 1 1 550 4,20 3,50 1
Croatia 1 1 553 5,76 6,72 3,84 1
Czech Republic 8 6 1 1 3497 57,40 40,50 8
Denmark 2 1 1 998 16,20 8,40 2
France 15 1 11 3 12965 160 347,00 10 160,90 4 15
Germany 55 11 10 33 1 23852 2902 643,24 350,94 54
Hungary 5 5 6330 80,10 46,45 5
Ireland 1 1 230 2,60 1,70
Italy 10 10 16615 290,50 136,30 10
Latvia 1 1 2320 500 24,00 5 16,80 5 1
Poland 7 5 2 2524 775,91 43,45 20,91 25,52 4,84 7
Portugal 1 1 239 56 7,14 0 2,02 0 1
Romania 8 8 3100 650 24,27 36 30,27 6 8
Slovakia 2 2 3135 45,11 38,77 2
Spain 4 3 1 4103 1300 31,50 25 22,70 8 4
Sweden 1 1 9 0,96 0,36
The Netherlands 4 3 1 5300 189,20 66,00 1
UK 7 3 3 1 4842 432 108,23 14 83,50 14 3
EU 143    69       26     44        4    100.027,6 6.775,9    2.030,2 117,6  1.122,3 41,8      39           94         
Number of facilities Working Gas 
(Mcm)
Withdrawal 
Capacity
(Mcm/d)
 Injection Capacity
(Mcm/d) 
Access regime
Total
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Source: JRC analysis on GSE maps for 2009 and 2014, and from LBEG 2010, 2013 
 
Figure 3. Total number of UGS (A), aggregated working volume (B) and average 
aggregated daily withdrawal capacity (C) per country in EU in 2009 and 2014. 
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Source: JRC analysis on GSE data 
Figure 4. Inventory level in percentage of the total working volume in the UGS in Europe 
from 2010 to 2014. 
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2.3 CROSS-BORDER CAPACITY AND PHYSICAL REVERSE FLOW 
Among different tools foreseen by Regulation (EU) 994/2010 [2] to increase and 
strengthen the level of EU security of supply, the use of physical bi-directional gas flow8 
(or reverse flow) has a special role. TSOs were obliged by the Regulation to enable 
permanent physical bi-directional capacity on all relevant cross border points by 3 
December 20139 and Competent Authorities are obliged to regularly check the need for 
reverse flows when they update their risk assessments and plans. 
In general the benefits of implementing reverse flow at a particular cross-border 
interconnection can be summarized in: 
 reverse flow can be an efficient and cost effective way of increasing entry 
capacity10; 
 it is a way to have access to new gas sources of supply; 
 it helps the shippers to rapidly and massively reroute gas deliveries within the 
internal market; 
 it provides a tool to change the direction of traditionally one-way transport 
routes in case that one of the Union's major supplies becomes unavailable. 
Reverse flow has been substantially implemented within the EU as the number of 
interconnection points increased from 24% in 2009 to 40% in 2014 (Table 4). Because 
of this natural gas can flow via almost every second interconnection point between 
Member States in both directions. Furthermore the geographical location of the new bi-
directional interconnections provides an increased flexibility of moving natural gas 
among MS and directions like North-South (with Denmark-Germany, Austria-Italy, 
Greece-Bulgaria and Romania-Hungary) or East-West (with Germany-Poland, France-
Spain, Austria-Slovakia) (Figure 5). All these improvements can certainly be regarded as 
an important success, though some strategic elements (like the cross-border 
interconnection of Obergailbach and Waidhaus, or the BBL pipeline) are still far from 
implementing bi-directional physical flows. 
As it has been clearly explained in the working document SWD(2014) 325 final [3]: “The 
majority of this development has come from commercial projects incentivized by the 
market demand. Nevertheless, Regulation 994/2010 has been instrumental in putting in 
place or speeding up physical reverse flows on some interconnections where voluntary 
market developments did not bring about the necessary results on time although reverse 
flows are crucial for security of supply reasons, such as on the Yamal pipeline between 
Poland and Germany, on the interconnection between Romania and Hungary and 
                                           
8 Physical reverse flow stands for the technical and commercial possibility that natural 
gas is transported in both directions across a certain interconnection point (up to the 
available technical capacity), independently from the quantity of gas coming from the 
prevailing forward direction. 
9  But the Competent Authorities may grant an exemption in case that the bi-
directional capacity would not significantly enhance the security of supply of any Member 
State or region, or if the investment costs would significantly outweigh the prospective 
benefits for security of supply. 
10 Implementing physical reverse flow is in general a cheap option. When a system 
has been designed to propel gas in one direction, making it bidirectional is a matter of 
upgrading the originally deployed compressor stations to propel gas also in the opposite 
direction. This is achieved by deploying the right pipelines and valves to allow suctioning 
gas from the pipelines that normally downstream and pushing the gas to the pipelines 
that are normally upstream. In general there is no need of deploying new compressor 
stations or other expensive facilities; nevertheless, gas quality and odorization may be 
an issue at some cross-border points that may make more expensive the achievement of 
bi-directional physical flow.  
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between Greece and Bulgaria. At the same time, the Regulation did not bring about 
changes in other, major interconnection points such as at Obergailbach (France-
Germany), Waidhaus (Czech Republic-Germany) or on the BBL pipeline (Netherlands-
UK).” 
The majority of interconnection points remaining unidirectional since 2009 (Figure 5) is 
due to an “exemption” granted by the Competent Authorities 11 . Exemptions were 
granted for different reasons like: 
 the interconnection links a MS at the end of the supply route ("cul-de-sac") 
with no possibility of having gas (e.g. through UGS) that could be shipped in 
the reverse direction, or the connection is directly linked with a distribution 
network or a production field; 
 different odorization practices on both sides of the border technically prevent 
the reverse flow; 
 it is unnecessary to make investments for ensuring reverse flows of L-gas into 
areas where L-gas may be supplied by blending H-gas. 
Along with the implementation of physical bi-directional capacity among MS, the overall 
capacity of the EU high pressure grid has improved as a whole of 4,1% since 2009 
(Table 5). Along with some new interconnections and associated capacity (like Romania-
Hungary, Hungary-Croatia), some MS have increased their capacity of moving gas 
substantially like Germany, Austria and Belgium (Figure 6). In the Netherlands, relevant 
improvements in the high pressure grid did not turn out in an increase of firm capacity – 
mainly with Germany – possibly for the downward general trend in gas consumption in 
the period 2010-2014 (a drop in total inland sales of 26% and of 12% respectively for 
the Netherlands and Germany [27, 28]). 
Capacity at international cross-border interconnections with non-EU countries shows a 
remarkable increase like with Norway (25% since 2009), with Northern Africa (32% 
mainly due to Almeria), and from Russia directly through Nord Stream or indirectly 
through Belarus (i.e., the Jamal pipeline) and Ukraine (17,5 % since 2009) (Table 5). 
Furthermore during 2014 reverse flow to Ukraine has been strengthen from Poland, 
Slovakia and Hungary with an overall capacity of 22,9 Mcm/d. Still, the diversification of 
supply sources to EU is not enough to provide safer conditions to its high dependency 
from a small number of producing countries. 
The improvements in interconnections, facilities (i.e., LNG and underground gas 
storages) and reverse flow capacity are reflected for many Member States in a general 
increase of the infrastructure standard (cfr. Art. 6 and Annex I of Reg. (EC) 994/2010) 
between 2012 and 201412 (Figure 7). The infrastructure, calculated using the N – 1 
formula, describes the ability of the technical capacity of the gas infrastructure to satisfy 
total gas demand in the calculated area in the event of disruption of the single largest 
gas infrastructure during a day of exceptionally high gas demand occurring with a 
statistical probability of once in 20 years. Figure 7 shows that the number of MS not 
satisfying the standard (i.e., N – 1 equal or greater than 100%) has decreased and the 
figures have increased on average 19 percentage points. In many cases this is primarily 
linked to the changes in the gas system and reinforced by a reduction of the demand in 
peak conditions. 
  
                                           
11 See Art. 7 “Procedure for enabling bi-directional capacity or seeking exemption” of 
Reg. (EC) 994/2010. 
12 Since Reg. (EC) 994/2010 entered in force, the Risk Assessment, the Preventive 
Action Plan and the Emergency Plan have been revised one time after their submission 
by 2012. The only exception is Croatia, which joined the European Union in 2013. 
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Table 4. Number of unidirectional and bi-directional cross-border interconnection points 
in the EU in 2009 and 2014 [29, 30].  
 In EU* With EU** 
 2009 2014 2009 2014 
Number of bi-directional interconnection points 12 21 1 3 
Number of unidirectional interconnection points 37 32 24 27 
Total number of cross-border 
interconnection points 
49 53 25 30 
* The analysis does not take into account low-pressure pipelines which cross the border to serve local demand and which are 
not part of the high-pressure transmission network and any cross-border interconnection with non EU Member States, with the 
exception of Switzerland. Source: JRC analysis on GIE and ENTSOG maps. 
** The analysis considers all pipelines cross-border points among an EU Member State and other neighbouring Countries 
(excluding Switzerland). The interconnection between the Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (i.e., Zvornik) is not 
considered. 
Source: JRC analysis on GIE and ENTSOG maps. 
 
 
 
Table 5. Capacity in million cubic meters per day (Mcm/d) at the interconnection points 
within Europe and among Europe and Norway, Northern Africa, Russia, Belarus and 
Ukraine, and other Countries (i.e., FYROM, Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Turkey).  
 2009 2014 % 09 – 14 
Aggregated capacity at cross-border points within the 
EU* 
1804,6 1879,4 4,1 
Aggregated capacity at cross-border points with 
Norway 
335,0 418,8 25,0 
Aggregated capacity at cross-border points with 
Northern Africa 
144,7 191,0 32,0 
Aggregated capacity at cross-border points with 
Russia, Belarus, Ukraine 
650,6 764,2 17,5 
Aggregated capacity at cross-border points with other 
Countries** 
62,5 61,7 -1,3 
Overall Total 2.997,4 3.315,0 10,6 
* And Switzerland. 
** Republic of Serbia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey. To make comparable this table to the cross-border 
points of Figure 5, the capacity for Zvornik (Republic of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) should be considered for 2009 
with a capacity of 1,9 NMcm/d, and for 2014 of 1,6 NMcm/d. 
Values were derived using the provided gross calorific value or, if missing, a reference value of 11,18. 
Source: JRC analysis on GIE and ENTSOG maps. 
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Figure 5. Map that indicates the physical bi-directional capacity (i.e., reverse flow) at 
cross-border interconnection points in the EU and Switzerland for 2009 and 2014, 
pointing to locations where improvements in the physical bi-directional have taken place 
[29, 30]. 
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Source: JRC on data from ENTSOG Capacity Map 2014, GTE Capacity Map 2009 
 
Figure 6. Comparison of the aggregated cross-border capacities among EU Member 
States and neighbouring Countries for 2009 and 2014 [29, 30]. See Annex 2 for details 
on data processing. 
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Figure 7. Comparison of the infrastructure standard (i.e., N-1 formula) between 2012 
and 2014 for EU Member States. 
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* The Member State applies demand-side measures (Annex I, Reg. (EC) 994/2010).
° MS exempted.         + The value is for the H-gas network.     § The standard is satisfied at the regional level with UK.
N.B.: Croatia joined the European Union in 2013. Ireland fulfils the requirement at the regional level with UK. Greece should be able to 
reach a Deff of 4.1 mcm/d in order to fulfil the requirement.
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3. GEMFLOW. A MASS BALANCE BASED MODEL OF THE EUROPEAN GAS 
SYSTEM 
Within the legal framework provided by the Regulation (EU) 994/2010 and the Directive 
2008/114/EC, simulation tools have been developed by the JRC to model the National 
Natural Gas Transmission System (NNGTS) of the EU Member States. The “Gas 
Emergency FLOW” model (GEMFLOW) is one of the technical tools created to deeply 
investigate emergency cases and supply crises [8, 9]. GEMFLOW is a model coupling a 
Monte-Carlo approach and a set of rules created to describe the behaviour of a NNGTS at 
the country level. The model has been built using the language of technical computing 
MatLab™ from MathWorks™. 
GEMFLOW is a mass balance network model in which 30 countries are defined as 
European countries (26 EU MS which are gas consumers plus Switzerland, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Nine other 
countries are described as gas suppliers to Europe (Algeria, Belarus, Libya, Morocco, 
Norway, Russia, Tunisia, Turkey and Ukraine), although some of them are just transit 
countries. Each country is defined as a node and it is connected to a neighbouring 
country through a single virtual pipeline that sums up the capacity of all the real 
pipelines that connect the two countries. The capacity of the virtual pipeline establishes 
the upper limit of gas that can be transported between them. Each country is defined by 
4 flow variables: domestic production (PROD), storage withdrawal flow (STO), 
regasification flow (LNG) and domestic consumption (CONS). The gas flow imported 
(IMP) and exported (EXP) is the result of the aggregation of all the gas flowing in and 
out of the country via pipeline.  
GEMFLOW aims at reaching the balance in the 30 European countries at any moment. A 
country 𝑖 is balanced when the following equation is fulfilled: 
 
PRODi + STOi + LNGi – CONSi + IMPi – EXPi = 0    (Eq. 1) 
 
If the result of the equation is lower than zero, the country will be unbalanced and 
therefore it will be unable of satisfying the demand. The countries with a balance lower 
than zero are in-need countries. The countries which have a balance higher than zero 
are gas provider countries and will send their spare gas to in-need countries. 
The model can simulate gas disruptions by decreasing the values of production, storage, 
regasification flow or the gas imported from one or several countries. GEMFLOW can also 
simulate the effect of an incremented gas demand by increasing the value of gas 
consumption in one or more countries. The length of the scenario simulated is a variable 
to be decided by the user. Scenarios with duration between 1 day and 6 months (180 
days) can be simulated. However, it must be born in mind that the initial value of the 
variable CONS (consumption) defined in eq. 1 is not changed during the simulation. It 
means that if a 30 day scenario is simulated, it is assumed that the consumption of a 
country remains constant during the whole period and it is set to its average daily 
consumption during that period. 
In order to obtain a balanced Europe, a strategy of three steps happening each day of 
the simulation has been designed in GEMFLOW (see Figure 8). The GEMFLOW strategy 
implements a Monte-Carlo approach for carrying out simulations. A Monte-Carlo 
simulation is a statistical technique to explore the behaviour and sensitivity of a complex 
system by manipulating parameters within defined statistical constraints. The core idea 
is to simulate a system, built up on a specific set of rules, by repeated random sampling 
of parameters from reference probability distributions to produce multiple possible 
outcomes, and record the outputs. The analysis of the statistical properties of the 
distribution of the outputs provides insights in the unknown probabilistic entity. Based on 
such an approach, GEMFLOW does not look for the ‘‘optimal’’ strategy through the 
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minimization of some indicators but allows the system to evolve freely following the 
model rules and producing a number of possible strategies to face the crisis. In this way 
(taking account of nearly all possible system operator decisions) it is possible to have a 
probabilistic picture of the resilience (stability) of the system. 
At the beginning of an analysis the user must specify the length of the simulation (i.e., 
the number of iterations to be completed by GEMFLOW) and the length of the scenario. 
A scenario of 30 days with 100 simulations means that a scenario is assessed for 30 
days and the assessment will be repeated 100 times. The solution obtained at the end of 
the simulation will show the probability of failure of each country and the average 
amount of unserved gas per country – considering all iterations – during the period of 
the study. 
GEMFLOW is built upon three steps. The first step is the “self-centred” step. When 
GEMFLOW finds an unbalanced country, named country 𝑖, it will try in the first place to 
use the domestic resources of the country in trouble to reach the balance. Thus, 
GEMFLOW will increase the production flow (until the maximum defined value). If this is 
not enough, it will increase the regasification flow and if it is still insufficient, it will 
change the storage withdrawal flow. The storage flow will be changed randomly from 
zero to the maximum withdrawal capacity. 
If the country 𝑖 is still unbalanced after the use of the internal resources, the exports of 
gas to neighbouring countries will be analysed. It may occur that country 𝑖 sends to one 
or more neighbouring countries a big enough amount of gas as to satisfy its own 
balance. If this is the case, at this point of the simulation, the country 𝑖 will stop sending 
gas to the neighbours in order to reach its own equilibrium. In case there are several gas 
neighbours to be shortened, the order and amount of gas curtailment will be chosen 
randomly by GEMFLOW. If the country 𝑖 sends gas to one or more neighbours but the 
amount of gas exported is not enough to reach its own balance, anyway the country 𝑖 
will stop sending gas to the neighbours to decrease its own unbalanced situation. 
At the end of step 1 there will be a number of unbalanced countries that managed to 
reach equilibrium after the measures taken during the step. But there will be other 
countries that they may have started from a balanced position and that became 
unbalanced after the curtailment of gas from the side of an unbalanced country. 
The second step is called the “solidarity” step. In this step GEMFLOW tries to reach the 
balance of all countries by means of sharing the spare gas of a provider country with the 
in-need neighbouring countries. The countries that are balanced at the beginning of the 
step are classified in terms of spare gas availability. Those countries balanced and with 
spare capacity - either to produce gas, to increase the withdrawal of stored gas or with 
additional regasification capacity - are classified as gas providers. Those countries 
balanced but with non-availability of spare gas are classified as gas transit countries. 
This means that, although they are no donors of gas, they can serve as a bridge 
between the gas provider countries and the in-need countries. On the other hand there 
are countries that start step 2 as unbalanced countries. It is possible that those 
countries have spare capacity in storage, production or regasification facilities due to the 
fact that the change in storage withdrawal in step 1 is done randomly or due to the 
curtailment of gas from a neighbouring country at the end of step 1. If the spare 
capacity of an unbalanced country is more than enough to balance itself, the extra gas 
will put the country in the position of becoming a gas provider. Once the countries are 
classified into gas providers or gas receivers the algorithm starts sending the gas from 
one to another provided that there is capacity available in the interconnection between 
countries. The algorithm of distribution of gas between neighbouring countries operates 
in a random manner. In this way there is not a determined strategy to prioritize one 
country over another. The higher the number of simulations introduced in GEMFLOW is, 
the bigger the spectrum of solutions obtained. 
Step 3 of GEMFLOW is the “counting” step. In this final step the countries are classified 
into balanced and unbalanced countries. The deficit of gas for the unbalanced countries 
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is recorded and the volume of gas remaining in the storage facilities is updated 
accordingly. 
When the three steps are completed, one day of the simulation has occurred. The 
second day of the simulation will start at step 1 with the updated values of each of the 
parameters.  
 
 
 
BALi is the calculated balance of country i in a certain time step. PROD indicates production. STO 
indicates the storage withdrawal capacity. LNG indicates the flow from the LNG facilities. 
 
Figure 8. Flow diagram of GEMFLOW model.  
(0-max)
(STOmax-STOi)+(PRODmax-PRODi)+
(LNGmax-LNGi)>0
(STOmax-STOi)+(PRODmax-PRODi)+
(LNGmax-LNGi)0
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3.1 INPUT DATA REQUIRED IN GEMFLOW 
GEMFLOW requires three different sets of input data to define the starting scenario from 
which all simulations are carried out. All data are organized in spreadsheets to be easily 
managed and updated. The first spreadsheet file is named the capacity matrix. It is a 
matrix that indicates the aggregated technical capacity between two countries. The 
exporting countries are in columns and the importing countries are in rows. Figure 9 
shows part of the capacity matrix used as input file in GEMFLOW. It can be seen, for 
example, that the technical capacity from Belgium (2nd column) to France (8th row) is 79 
Mcm/d. Between Belgium and France there are three interconnections and the 
aggregated maximum capacity for the three of them is 79 Mcm/d. On the contrary, the 
capacity from France (8th column) to Belgium (2nd row) is zero. This means that there is 
no reverse capacity in any of the three interconnections. The value of the capacity 
establishes the upper limit of gas that can be transferred from one country to another. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Part of the capacity matrix which reflects the aggregated technical capacity 
between countries; from countries in the columns to countries in the rows (units: 
Mcm/d).  
 
 
The second spreadsheet file required by GEMFLOW is named the flow matrix. This matrix 
has the same structure as the capacity matrix but in this case the values in the 
intersection between columns and rows indicate the aggregated flow between countries 
for the particular scenario that the user wants to study. Figure 10 for example shows 
that the gas flow from Belgium to France for that specific scenario is 48,79 Mcm/d. The 
flow exchanged between countries cannot be higher than the maximum capacity 
between countries indicated in the capacity matrix.  
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Figure 10. Part of the flow matrix which reflects the flow exchanged between countries 
in a particular time frame (units: Mcm/d).  
 
The last spreadsheet file required by GEMFLOW indicates the gas features of each 
country for the specific time frame of the simulation. Table 6 shows part of an example 
of a spreadsheet file with the values of average daily consumption (CONS), minimum 
daily consumption (Min. CONS), average daily national production (PROD), maximum 
daily production (Max. PROD), average daily regasification flow (LNG), maximum daily 
regasification capacity (Max. LNG), average daily storage withdrawal (STO), maximum 
daily storage withdrawal capacity (Max. STO), average volume of gas in the storage 
(STO Inventory), maximum capacity volume of gas in the storage (STO Max. Inventory) 
per each country. Annex 2 provides the data used for determining the features for each 
country for the year 2009 and 2014 with reference period January. 
 
 
Table 6. An example of the structure and data types used to build the country features 
table.  
COUNTRY CONS 
Min. 
CONS 
PROD 
Max. 
PROD 
LNG 
Max. 
LNG 
STO 
Max. 
STO 
STO 
Inventory 
STO 
Max. Inventory 
Austria 38,18 38,18 3,06 5,10 0,00 0,00 18,14 94,38 4400,50 8166,00 
Belgium 72,93 72,93 0,00 0,00 3,39 40,80 2,27 15,00 471,13 700,00 
Bulgaria 11,60 11,60 0,72 1,03 0,00 0,00 3,12 4,20 357,19 550,00 
Units: Mcm/d; units of STO Inventory and STO Max. Inventory: Mcm 
 
 
The capacity matrix establishes the limits for the import and export flows and therefore 
it is a fixed matrix with determined values for the reference year of the simulation. 
However the flow matrix and the gas features table can be changed to simulate a crisis 
or a disruption. For instance, the impact of decreasing gas production in Europe can be 
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Austria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.86
Belgium 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.37
Bulgaria 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Czech Rep. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 94.32
Denmark 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56
Estonia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Finland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France 0.00 48.79 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 24.80
Germany 4.42 0.00 0.00 75.87 1.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Greece 0.00 0.00 6.91 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hungary 10.97 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ireland 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Italy 100.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Latvia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Lithuania 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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simulated by decreasing the value of maximum daily production (Max. PROD) of Figure 9 
in all countries. Another example of a simulation is to decrease the gas flow coming from 
a gas supplier to Europe. In order to simulate this, the gas flows of the column of a 
European gas supplier (for example Norway or Russia) in the flow matrix of Figure 8 
should be decreased or set to zero. 
Table 7 provides the relevant official data source used for populating the input to 
GEMFLOW. The cross-border capacity matrix has been calculated by using data provided 
by ENTSOG and GIE (for 2009). The flow matrix has been computed as average daily 
flow from the monthly data of IEA for January 2014 and 2009. The country feature data 
set is built using figures (see Annex 3): 
 
 from GIE-GLE, GIE-GSE (i.e., Table 2 and Table 3) for the infrastructure 
maximum flows and capacities; 
 from AGSI+ and ALSI for the inventory level and average send-out of January 
2014 (using the first half of the month), while for 2009 data from a report to 
the Gas Coordination Group were used to have an estimate; 
 domestic production has been estimated as the average from the monthly 
production of January and as the maximum daily production by considering 
the average over the last three years for each reference year (e.g., for 2014 
data were pulled by 2014, 2013 and 2012); 
 consumption levels for 2014 and for 2009 were estimated from IEA monthly 
total consumption figures by dividing for the number of days in January. For 
the MS most affected during the gas crisis of 2009, consumption was 
estimated by considering an average between December 2008 and February 
2009. 
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Table 7. Data sources used to build the input data sets for the comparison of the 
behaviour of the European high pressure natural gas grid for the year 2009 and 2014. 
Input for 
GEMFLOW 
Data Source Web page 
Country feature: 
UGS 
 
 
LNG 
 
 
Consumption and 
Production 
 
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) – 
AGSI+ Aggregated Gas Storage 
Inventory 
GIE-GSE Storage MAP 2014, 2009 
Gas Infrastructure Europe (GIE) – 
ALSI Aggregated LNG Storage 
Inventory 
GIE-GLE LNG MAP 2014, 2009 
 
 
IEA data for .OECD countries  
 
JodiGas for non OECD countries and 
EUROSTAT data () 
 
National statistics for Republic of 
Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
FYROM 
 
transparency.gie.eu 
 
 
lngdataplatform.gie.eu 
 
 
www.iea.org/statistics/relateds
urveys/monthlygasdatasurvey 
www.jodidata.org/gas/database
/data-downloads.aspx 
epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
 
National web-pages 
 
Cross-border 
capacities 
ENTSOG Transparency Platform and 
ENTSOG map for capacity at cross-
border interconnection points (for 
year 2009) 
www.gas-roads.eu 
Cross-border flows IEA – Gas Trade Flow in Europe: 
Monthly aggregated values of flows 
among European countries  
www.iea.org/gtf/index.asp 
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3.2 PERFORMANCE OF THE EUROPEAN GRID DURING SIMULATED CRISIS 
A simulation approach has been used to carry out a first assessment of the behaviour of 
the high pressure European natural gas grid and the effects of the changes in the 
infrastructure between 2009 and 2014. The main objective is to explore the gas network 
resilience under non market conditions (i.e., due to a geopolitical crisis, a commercial 
dispute between different parties or a disruption of a main import route to Europe). 
The use of GEMFLOW allows to assess in statistical terms the likelihood and extent of 
unserved gas to customers in a country as a result of different possible allocation 
strategies and import-export options. This provides a better way of evaluating changes 
in the infrastructure (i) by considering the entire system, (ii) by explicitly using 
interactions among the system's components (i.e., LNG, UGS, production, import and 
export) and (iii) by addressing the geographical nature of the problem (i.e., peculiarities 
of interconnections between neighbouring countries, partial / total isolation of some EU 
regions and characteristics of the different national transmission systems). The 
improvements of gas infrastructures, the adoption of bi-directional capacity together 
with the decrease of gas consumption in Europe might indicate beforehand that Europe 
is better equipped to tackle a major gas crisis in 2014 than in 2009. However, in order to 
establish a fair playfield for the simulations carried out, some assumptions have been 
adopted. 
The total EU gas consumption in 2014 decreased 6% respect to 2009. However the 
decrease in gas demand has not been continuous since 2009. In 2010 the gas 
consumption increased (8 % respect to 2009, [31, 32]) and represents the highest 
European gas demand in history. Therefore in all scenarios, both 2009 and 2014, the 
values of gas consumption corresponding to 2010 are used. In this manner, the impact 
of new infrastructure is really assessed and the seasonal changes of gas consumption 
are ignored.  
The monthly volume of gas in storages is another seasonal factor that varies along the 
months and may change among the years. For this reason, for all cases studied in this 
paper the volume of storages has been set at 70% of the maximum working capacity. It 
means that when the crisis starts the volume in all the EU storage facilities is set to 70% 
of the maximum inventory capacity. The regasification capacity has been treated in the 
same manner. LNG terminals have a maximum send-out capacity that it is somehow 
related to the size and stock level of the LNG tank. Maintaining a certain stock level in 
the LNG tank depends in turn on the frequency that ships are received. The 
regasification terminals are designed to maintain the maximum send-out for at least one 
day without restrictions however the crises in this study have 30 or 90 days duration. 
Bearing in mind the possible limits of a LNG terminal to operate at its maximum send-
out capacity during long periods of times, the maximum regasification capacity has been 
set at a rate of 70% of its real maximum in all scenarios simulated both in 2009 and 
2014. 
Based on the above assumption two scenarios are studied with GEMFLOW model, 
corresponding to the cut of supply from one of the most important natural gas providers 
to Europe, which is Russia13. In the first scenario a disruption of the flows in transit 
through Ukraine is considered. In the second scenario all flows of natural gas originated 
in Russia are cut (i.e., natural gas in transit through Ukraine, through Belarus and by the 
Nord Stream pipeline to Germany). The length of the disruption is set to 30 and to 90 
days for both scenarios, with the 30 days scenario starting in January. A total number of 
300 simulations per scenario are carried out in GEMFLOW. 
In order to evaluate the impact of a gas disruption at country level three variables are 
considered: the percentage of failure, the first day of failure and the average percentage 
                                           
13 Russia covered approximately 39% of EU gas imports by volume in 2013 [19]. 
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of unserved gas. The percentage of failure represents the number of simulations out of 
the total in which a country is not able to satisfy its demand for the entire simulation 
period. Since the scenarios simulated represent crisis of long duration (30 and 90 days) 
and random strategies are applied in each run, it might happen that a country only 
experiences lack of gas at the end of the period when a specific strategy is applied. The 
variable named first day of failure indicates the average first day in which a country 
experiences lack of gas. This value is obtained by averaging the first day of failure 
obtained only in the runs where a country fails. Therefore, the runs in which the country 
does not experience lack of gas (failure day null) are not taken into account in the 
average. The variable named average percentage of unserved gas computes the amount 
of unserved gas in a country out of the total gas demanded during the 30 or 90-day 
duration of the crisis simulated. In this case the average is computed over all simulations 
performed, not only on those where there is some non-null unserved gas. 
The results obtained for the Ukrainian scenario, i.e. disruption from Russian gas only 
through Ukraine, are reported in Table 8 and Table 9 for a crisis of 30 and 90 days 
duration respectively. The results obtained for the Russian scenario, i.e. total gas 
disruption from Russia, of 30 and 90 days are shown in Table 10 and Table 11 
respectively. 
The percentage of failure and the average percentage of unserved gas are both key 
variables that provide insights in the ability of a country to survive a gas disruption. 
There are countries that have a high probability of failure however the amount of 
unserved gas is insignificant. The impact of a gas disruption is higher when both 
variables, probability of failure and percentage of unserved gas, are high. Figure 11  and 
Figure 12 show the percentage of unserved gas for the Ukrainian and Russian scenario of 
30 and 90 days in a geographical way. Values below the threshold of 2,5% are not 
displayed as they are deemed to be not significant. 
The comparison of the results obtained for the simulated crises reveals an increase in 
the resilience of the gas system to cope with gas disruptions. In general, 2014 scenarios 
show a lesser impact in terms of unserved gas than 2009 scenarios. In addition, 30-day 
duration scenarios have a lower impact than 90-day cases. 
Although in general terms most of the countries improve their capacity to tackle these 
gas disruptions, the effect of gas shortages is still severe for some Member States 
dependent mainly on a single supply source or only a national cross-border entry. This is 
the case of Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Finland. It is observed 
that the changes in the South-Eastern corridor (i.e., Romania – Bulgaria – Greece) along 
with the new improvements in Hungary have provided better options for the region to 
cope with a relevant shortage of supply both from Ukraine and total disruption from 
Russia. The increased storage capacity in Poland and Germany, the increment of LNG 
send-out capacity in France and the Netherlands, and the new bi-directional cross-border 
points in many MS are important upgrades to moderate the impact of the Russian crisis 
in 2014 scenarios. This is evident for the 30-day scenario and also for the 90-day case. 
It can be noted that in the 30-day and 90-day Russian gas disruptions the average 
unserved amount of gas is slightly higher in 2014 for some countries, such as Italy, 
Estonia or Sweden. This is related to the change in the firm capacity at interconnection 
points declared in 2014 [30] (see also Figure 6) and the new bi-directional capacity 
implemented between MS. The solidarity approach established by the model in order to 
distribute the spare gas of a country is influenced by the change in the interconnection 
capacities and therefore the sharing out of the spare gas experienced different strategies 
than in 2009. This effect can be appreciated, for example, in Italy in the Russian crisis of 
90 days where the average percentage of unserved gas increases from 14.3% in 2009 to 
16.7% in 2014 but nevertheless, countries highly interconnected to Italy, such as 
Slovenia or Austria, decrease the unserved gas. Another similar example can be seen in 
Sweden. Swedish unserved gas increases in 2014 since Denmark shares – in the 
30 
 
simulations - spare gas primarily with Germany thanks to a higher interconnection 
capacity among both countries. 
In general terms, when analysing the effect of a major gas disruption at European level, 
it can be seen that in the case of the Ukrainian crisis the average unserved gas observed 
for the scenario of 30 days duration is 1,2% in 2009 and 0,5% in 2014. The average 
unserved gas observed for the scenario of 30 days duration is 5,7% in 2009 and a 
reduction to 2,0% in 2014. The 30-day Russian crisis leads to an average 3,6% of 
unserved gas in 2009 and 2,2% in 2014. The same event happening during 90 days 
yields to a 9,9% and 6,6% average unserved gas in 2009 and 2014 respectively.  
Overall it can be stated that the incorporation of new infrastructure to the European gas 
grid, including the availability of reverse flow, has provided more flexibility to better 
support shortages of supply from Eastern Europe pipeline routes. 
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Table 8. Percentage of failure, average first day of failure and average percentage of 
unserved gas obtained per country when simulating 30 days of gas disruption from 
Ukraine in 2009 and 2014. 
 
UKRAINIAN CRISIS 
Duration of the crisis: 30 days. 
Number of Monte Carlo simulations: 300 
 
 2009 2014 
COUNTRIES 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Austria 0  0 0  0 
Belgium 0  0 0  0 
Bulgaria 100 1 81,3 100 1 71,6 
Czech 
Republic 0 
 0 0  0 
Denmark 0  0 0  0 
Estonia 0  0 0  0 
Finland 0  0 0  0 
France 0  0 0  0 
Germany 0  0 0  0 
Greece 100 1 13,0 100 1 6,3 
Hungary 100 1 6,5 0  0 
Ireland 0  0 0  0 
Italy 0  0 8 29 <0,1 
Latvia 0  0 0  0 
Lithuania 0  0 0  0 
Luxemburg 0  0 0  0 
Netherlands 0  0 0  0 
Poland 0  0 0  0 
Portugal 0  0 0  0 
Romania 0  0 0  0 
Slovakia 0  0 0  0 
Slovenia 100 3 10,2 44 16 0,5 
Spain 0  0 0  0 
Sweden 0  0 93 8 2,4 
Switzerland 0  0 0  0 
United 
Kingdom 0 
 0 0  0 
Bosnia 100 1 100 73 13 3,1 
Serbia 100 1 92,3 21 28 0,1 
Croatia 0  0 0  0 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
100 1 100 100 1 100 
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TABLE 9. Percentage of failure, average first day of failure and average percentage of 
unserved gas obtained per country when simulating 90 days of gas disruption from 
Ukraine in 2009 and 2014. 
 
UKRAINIAN CRISIS 
Duration of the crisis: 90 days. 
Number of Monte Carlo simulations: 300 
 
 2009 2014 
COUNTRIES 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Austria 100 70 3,4 0  0 
Belgium 0  0 0  0 
Bulgaria 100 1 82,9 100 1 73,0 
Czech 
Republic 
100 69 17,5 3 87 0 
Denmark 0  0 0  0 
Estonia 0  0 100 79 1,1 
Finland 0  0 0  0 
France 100 68 8,1 4 85 <0,1 
Germany 100 70 3,3 0  0 
Greece 100 1 8,6 100 1 1,5 
Hungary 100 28 14,2 93 77 0,3 
Ireland 0  0 0  0 
Italy 100 66 13,4 100 61 9,2 
Latvia 0  0 0  0 
Lithuania 0  0 100 79 0,3 
Luxemburg 100 69 6,0 44 86 0,3 
Netherlands 0  0 0  0 
Poland 0  0 0  0 
Portugal 0  0 0  0 
Romania 100 73 0,3 100 67 0,2 
Slovakia 100 69 10,0 30 87 0,2 
Slovenia 100 3 35,1 100 55 9,5 
Spain 0  0 0  0 
Sweden 0  0 99 43 1,4 
Switzerland 100 70 23,6 1 83 <0,1 
United 
Kingdom 
0  0 0  0 
Bosnia 100 1 100 100 54 22,9 
Serbia 100 1 75,0 100 59 7,3 
Croatia 0  0 0  0 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
100 1 100 100 1 100 
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Figure 11. Comparison of the average percentage of unserved gas for the two scenarios 
of 30 (top) and 90 (bottom) days crisis for a disruption through Ukraine between 2009 
(left) and 2014 (right). 
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Table 10. Percentage of failure, average first day of failure and average percentage of 
unserved gas obtained per country when simulating 30 days of gas disruption from 
Russia in 2009 and 2014 
 
RUSSIAN CRISIS 
Duration of the crisis: 30 days. 
Number of Monte Carlo simulations: 300 
 
 2009 2014 
COUNTRIES 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Austria 0  0 0  0 
Belgium 0  0 0  0 
Bulgaria 100 1 81,3 100 1 71,6 
Czech Rep. 0  0 0  0 
Denmark 0  0 0  0 
Estonia 100 2 9,1 100 2 21,7 
Finland 100 1 100 100 1 100 
France 0  0 0  0 
Germany 0  0 0  0 
Greece 100 1 13,0 100 1 6,3 
Hungary 100 1 6,2 0  0 
Ireland 0  0 0  0 
Italy 4 1 <0,1 8 29 0 
Latvia 0  0 0  0 
Lithuania 100 1 66,1 100 1 63,1 
Luxemburg 0  0 0  0 
Netherlands 0  0 0  0 
Poland 100 1 36,9 100 1 13,0 
Portugal 0  0 0  0 
Romania 0  0 0  0 
Slovakia 0  0 0  0 
Slovenia 100 2 11,3 64 14 0,8 
Spain 0  0 0  0 
Sweden 0  0 100 7 3,1 
Switzerland 0  0 0  0 
United 
Kingdom 
0  0 0  0 
Bosnia 100 1 100 90 11 5,4 
Serbia 100 1 92,3 35 28 0,1 
Croatia 0  0 0  0 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
100 1 100 100 1 100 
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Table 11. Percentage of failure, average first day of failure and average percentage of 
unserved gas obtained per country when simulating 90 days of gas disruption from 
Russia in 2009 and 2014 
 
RUSSIAN CRISIS 
Duration of the crisis: 90 days. 
Number of Monte Carlo simulations: 300 
 
 2009 2014 
COUNTRIES 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Percentage 
of Failure 
(%) 
First 
Day of 
Failure 
Average 
Unserved 
Gas (%) 
Austria 100 64 3,9 0  0 
Belgium 0  0 0  0 
Bulgaria 100 1 82,9 100 1 73,0 
Czech Rep. 100 64 21,4 100 68 18,3 
Denmark 0  0 0  0 
Estonia 100 2 30,9 100 2 37,8 
Finland 100 1 100 100 1 100 
France 100 66 9,3 100 74 3,8 
Germany 100 64 8,7 100 68 1,2 
Greece 100 1 8,6 100 1 1,5 
Hungary 100 27 14,8 100 68 1,7 
Ireland 0  0 0  0 
Italy 100 64 14,3 100 57 16,7 
Latvia 0  0 0  0 
Lithuania 100 1 74,1 100 1 72,4 
Luxemburg 100 64 7,7 100 68 8,8 
Netherlands 0  0 0  0 
Poland 100 1 47,7 100 1 24,7 
Portugal 0  0 0  0 
Romania 100 73 0,3 100 65 0,5 
Slovakia 100 64 12,0 100 69 8,2 
Slovenia 100 3 37,9 100 50 19,8 
Spain 0  0 0  0 
Sweden 0  0 100 21 6,7 
Switzerland 100 66 27,4 100 74 18,7 
United 
Kingdom 
0  0 0  0 
Bosnia 100 1 100 100 52 28,5 
Serbia 100 1 75,2 100 56 13,7 
Croatia 0  0 0  0 
Former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
100 1 100 100 1 100 
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Figure 12. Comparison of average percentage of unserved gas for the two scenarios of 
30 (top) and 90 (bottom) days crisis for a total disruption of gas from Russia between 
2009 (left) and 2014 (right). 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
This report provides a first assessment of the effects and magnitude of the 
improvements – from the infrastructure point of view – implemented between 2009 and 
2014 in the European high pressure grid system. The developments achieved in the 
European natural gas system can be traced back to the adoption by the European 
Commission of the third package of legislative proposals for electricity and gas markets, 
to the application of Regulation (EC) 994/2010 on security of supply, to the increased 
liquidity of the market (though still regionally in many cases) and the flexibility of 
European TSOs. 
Relevant investments promoted by many TSOs and strategically supported by the 
European Commission as “Projects of Common Interest” (PCI) [33] have created the 
conditions to boost the technical performance of the European gas grid to start to solve 
some still open challenges of the on-going transition of the European energy system. In 
particular, major steps forward have been accomplished in the direction of completing an 
internal energy market. 
Between 2009 and 2014 the EU gas system has experienced the following 
improvements: 
 The EU high pressure grid has grown on average 6% regarding pipeline 
infrastructure within and between MS. In addition the ability to transport gas has 
improved by increasing the total installed compressor power.  
 The number of EU LNG terminals has increased by four units in the period and the 
nominal annual aggregated send-out capacity increased by 41% from 134 to 189 
Bcm per year. Such changes provide the opportunity for many MS to reduce their 
dependence from a single supplier. However the EU LNG market has experienced 
a substantial reduction since 2011 due to, among other factors, the decrease in 
gas demand. 
 The number of UGS facilities and the working storage capacity have increased 
11% and 21% respectively, with a total of 143 sites and a capacity of 100 Bcm. 
In line with the European energy policy, UGS are playing more and more a 
strategic role in providing reliable sources during crises or exceptional conditions, 
as it can react quickly to sudden peaks and it can be geographically near to the 
consumption areas. 
 Reverse flow has been substantially implemented within the EU as the number of 
interconnection points increased from 24% to 40% and the overall capacity at 
cross-border points has improved as a whole by 10,6% from 2.997 Mcm/d to 
3.315 Mcm/d. However some relevant bottlenecks still exist in the EU grid (e.g., 
the South-East corridor, interconnections between France and Spain or France 
and Germany and Belgium) and some member States are still poorly or not 
connected to the main EU system (e.g., the Baltic Region and Finland, Croatia, 
Bulgaria and Greece). 
 The infrastructure standard, introduced by Regulation 994/2010, quantifies the 
ability of MS, in terms of available infrastructure, to satisfy total gas demand in 
the event of disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure. The value of the 
N-1 indicator increased on average 19 percentage points between 2012 and 
2014. This is primarily linked to the general improvements in the EU gas 
infrastructure and reinforced by a reduction of the demand in peak conditions. 
The second part of the report focuses on the use of a mass-balance simulation tool – 
GEMFLOW – to assess the effects of the infrastructural improvements on the overall 
behaviour of the European natural gas high pressure system under specific crisis 
scenarios. The simulation tool can quantify in statistical terms probability and impact of 
failure for each country by considering all the links and interactions of the key 
components of the EU gas system. In addition GEMFLOW can help to understand where 
possible cross-border bottlenecks are and where actions could be addressed. 
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Two scenarios were analysed, the partial cut of supply from Russia through Ukraine and 
the total cut of gas from Russia during a period of 30 and 90 days. The results show that 
in all cases the overall amount of unserved gas in 2014 decreased at EU level and, in 
general, at MS level. This reveals that the incorporation of new infrastructure, including 
the availability of reverse flow, has provided more flexibility to better support shortages 
of supply from Eastern Europe pipeline routes. However the impact of the simulated gas 
crises could still be severe for some European Countries, which are isolated or dependent 
on a single supply source, such as the case of Bulgaria, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia, Finland or the Baltic Region. For this region and for Poland the situation will 
improve because of the new felicity and capacity provided by the start of commercial 
operations of the LNG terminal of Klapédia (Lithuania) in January 2015 and the up-
coming new LNG facilities of Świnoujście (Poland) in 2016. On the other hand, the 
changes in the South-Eastern corridor (i.e., Romania – Bulgaria – Greece) along with the 
new improvements in Hungary have provided better options for the region to cope with a 
relevant shortage of supply. Other changes in the EU infrastructure, such as the 
increased storage capacity in Poland and Germany, and the increment of LNG send-out 
capacity in France and the Netherlands, are important upgrades to moderate the impact 
of the Russian crisis in 2014 scenarios. 
 
Further research should be carried out to reach a better understanding of the key 
components and mechanisms of the European gas system to react to shocks or 
scenarios of disruption. In this respect the Institute of Energy and Transport of the Joint 
Research Centre is acting in multiple directions. On one side GEMFLOW is under continue 
development as to better integrate into the simulation time dependent parameters (like 
variable supply profiles from interconnections with non EU Countries or consumption 
profiles for Member States), protected customers and fuel switching effects from the 
gas-driven electricity facilities. On the other side, the JRC is completing the EUGas 
project. The “European Gas assessment” tool (EUGas) [34] is a full hydraulic model of 
the transmission and transit grids of the European Union describing the geography, 
topology and properties of each relevant component of the national systems (i.e., 
production sites, storage facilities, LNG terminals, compressor stations, cross-border 
points and consumption off-takes). EUGas allows simulating the physics of natural gas 
transmission – seeking a steady state solution – and also allows assessing the behaviour 
of a grid under different consumption states or disruption scenarios. Finally, looking only 
at the natural gas system gives precious insights, but without a vision of the complex 
behaviour and interactions among sectors and energy sources, it is hard to understand 
impacts and trends in the entire energy system. Energy system models like the JRC 
Energy Trade Model [35, 36] should be used to frame a sectorial analysis and to 
understand how competition among energy sources could perform. 
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ANNEX 1 
The websites of TSOs have been checked to assess nature and type of the information 
concerning capacities and flows provided to the public based on the application of 
Regulation (EC) No. 715/2009. Capacities and flows data are classified into three 
categories: “one value” when only an overall figure is provided; “By categories” when 
users or flow categories are available or “By off-take point” when data are published by 
major exit point. Data are further categorised based on the type of the flow/capacity 
(i.e., consumption, production, storage, LNG, import/export through cross-border points 
or linepack), unit of measure (i.e., energy or volume units), time granularity (i.e., 
hourly, daily or monthly figures) 
The survey has been carried out from January 2015 till March 2015. 
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o
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a
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y
 
WWW link 
Austria 
GAS CONNECT –  
BOG m.b.H.    
y 
      
y y n 
 
y y 
  
y https://mgm.gasconnect.at/gca_mgm/mgm/data.do 
TAG 
   
Y 
  
y 
 
y 
 
y 
 
n 
 
y y 
 
y 
 
http://www.taggmbh.at/allsite_prod1/ContentView/3/FrontEnd?pageId=20136 
Belgium FULXYS  
   
y 
  
y 
 
y n y y y 
 
y y 
 
y y https://gasdata.fluxys.com/?sc_lang=en 
Bulgaria Bulgartransgaz 
    
y 
 
y 
 
y 
 
y y n 
  
y 
 
y 
 
http://www.bulgartransgaz.bg/en/pages/kapacitet1-98.html 
Czech Rep. NET4GAS 
    
y 
  
y y 
 
y y n y y y 
 
y 
 
http://extranet.net4gas.cz/gas_flow.aspx 
Croatia Plinacro y         n   n       http://www.plinacro.hr 
Denmark Energinet.dk 
     
y 
  
y 
   
n 
 
y 
   
y https://www.energinet.dk/EN/GAS/Gasdata-og-kvalitet/Sider/Gas-leveret-i-Danmark.aspx 
Estonia EG Võrguteenus 
       
y 
 
n y n n 
  
y 
 
y 
 
http://www.egvorguteenus.ee/en/public-information/gas-supply/ 
Finland (*) Gasum y 
      
y 
 
y y n n 
  
y 
  
y http://www.gasum.com/transmission-portal/Finlands-gas-network/ 
France 
GRTgaz 
   
y 
  
y 
 
y 
 
y y y y y y y y 
 
http://www.smart.grtgaz.com/en 
TIGF 
   
y 
  
y y 
  
y y y y y y 
 
y 
 
http://tetra.tigf.fr/SBT/public/PointsCommerciaux.do?action=liste 
Germany 
OPEN GRID 
EUROPE    
y 
  
y 
 
y y y y n 
 
y y 
 
y 
 
https://www.open-grid-europe.com/cps/rde/xchg/open-grid-europe-internet/hs.xsl/2100.htm 
ONTRAS 
   
y 
  
y 
 
y y y y n 
 
y 
  
y 
 
https://www.ontras.com/cms/transparenz/transparenz-tool/?L=2 
GASCADE 
      
y 
   
y y n 
 
y 
  
y 
 
https://gascade.biz/ivo/ 
GASUNIE 
Deutschland    
y 
  
y 
  
y y y n 
 
y y 
 
y y http://transparenz.gasunie.de/mts.web/netzkarte/Index?lang=en&inst=gud 
GRTgaz 
Deutschland   
y 
  
y 
    
y y n 
 
y 
  
y y http://www.grtgaz-deutschland.de/en/networkaccess/networkdata 
Bayernets 
    
y 
  
y y 
 
y y n 
 
y 
  
y 
 
http://www.bayernets.de/start_en.aspx 
Greece DEFSA 
       
y y n y n y 
 
y y 
 
y y http://www.desfa.gr/default.asp?pid=223&la=2 
Hungary FGSZ 
    
y 
  
y y y y y n y y y 
 
y 
 
http://tsodata.fgsz.hu/en/pub_data 
Ireland Gaslink 
    
y 
  
y 
  
y y n 
 
y 
  
y 
 
http://web1.bgegtms.ie/ 
Italy Snamretegas 
   
y 
  
y 
 
y y y y y 
 
y y 
 
y y http://www.snamretegas.it/it/servizi/Quantita_gas_trasportato/1_Dati_di_oggi/ 
Latvia Dabsgaze y 
        
n 
  
n 
      
http://www.lg.lv/ 
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V
o
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e
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*
 
m
o
n
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ly
 
d
a
il
y
 
h
o
u
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y
 
WWW link 
Lithuania Amber Grid 
    
y 
  
y 
 
n y n y 
  
y 
 
y 
 http://www.ambergrid.lt/en/capacity 
Luxemburg Creos y 
        
n 
 
n n 
      http://www.creos-net.lu/ 
the 
Netherlands 
GASUNIE  
   
y 
  
y 
 
y y y y y 
 
y y 
 
y 
 http://www.gasunietransportservices.nl/en/transportinformation/dataport  
Poland Gaz System 
    
y 
  
y y y y y n 
 
y y 
 
y 
 http://en.gaz-system.pl/strefa-klienta/krajowy-system-przesylowy/zdolnosc-przesylowa/ 
Portugal REN – Gasodutos 
 
y 
    
y 
  
n 
 
y y 
 
y 
  
y 
 https://www.ign.ren.pt/web/guest/existencias 
Romania Transgaz 
    
y 
  
y y y y y n 
 
y y 
 
y 
 http://www.transgaz.ro/en/informa%C8%9Bii-clien%C8%9Bi/operational-data 
Slovakia EUStream 
    
y 
  
y y 
 
y 
 
n 
 
y y 
 
y 
 https://tis.eustream.sk/TIS/#/?nav=rd.flw 
Slovenia Plinovodi 
   
y y 
 
y y y n y n n 
 
y y 
 
y 
 http://www.plinovodi.si/en/for-users/network-information 
Spain Enagas 
   
y 
  
y 
 
y 
 
y y y y y y 
 
y y 
http://www.enagas.es/enagas/en/Gestion_Tecnica_Sistema/DemandaGas/Demanda_Tiempo_Real  
Sweden SwedeGas 
    
y 
  
y y n y y y 
 
y 
  
y 
 http://www.swedegas.se/vara_tjanster/gasinformation/statistik/ 
United 
Kingdom 
National Grid 
   
y y 
 
y y y 
 
y y y y y y 
 
y y 
http://www2.nationalgrid.com/uk/industry-information/gas-transmission-operational-data/ 
* Data are not available due to the renewal of network´s control system (30/03/2015).  
** For some web-sites it was unclear if volumes were expressed using normal or standard conditions. 
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ANNEX 2 
The diagram presented in Figure 6 was obtained by aggregating the data published in 
“The European Natural Gas Network 2014 – Capacities at cross-border points on the 
primary market” (version June 201414) by ENTSOG and in “The European Natural Gas 
Network 2009 – Capacities at cross-border points on the primary market” by Gas 
Transmission Europe (GTE). In few cases, figures from other versions of the NETSOG 
maps, notably version “June 2010”, were used. 
Conversion from GWh/d to mcm/d (i.e., millions of normal cubic meters per day) is 
carried out assuming a gross-calorific value of 11.18 (kWh/Nm3 at combustion 
temperature of 25 °C). No difference between high- or low-calorific content is made. 
For interconnection points, numbers in brackets refer to the identification number of the 
interconnection point used in the ENTSOG 2014 capacities map. 
Figures concerning firm capacities at cross-border points were calculated by considering 
only main interconnections among national high pressure grids. The following 
interconnections were not considered: Bizzarone (n. 66), Jura (n. 68), Tegelen (n. 70), 
Haanrade (n. 63), VIP Kiefersfelden-Pfronten (n. 69), Iasi – Ungheni (operational during 
2014 but not reported by ENTSOG). 
Underground gas storages were not considered as contributing capacity to 
interconnection points. The values reported in the ENTSOG map for 2014 for Dolni 
Bojanovice / Brocké (n. 59), Láb (SK) / Láb IV (n. 60), Haiming 2 7F / Haiming 2-7F 
(OGE) (n. 61) and Haidach (AT) / Haidach USP (DE) (n. 62) were not used. 
Though reported in the ENTSOG map, the interconnection of Ruse – Giurgiu (n. 64) was 
excluded as not operational in 2014. 
The capacity for 2009 of the interconnection point at Vlieghuis (n. 14) was estimated 
using the value published in the ENTSOG map for 2011. 
The interconnection at Hermanowice (n. 65) has been considered as a brand new point.  
The reverse flow to Ukraine from Hungary has been considered as belonging to one 
single aggregated point Beregdaróc – Beregovo (n. 219). The reverse flow has been 
estimated using the firm interruptible capacity at Beragdaróc in March 2014. 
Because GTE map for 2009 reports an aggregated figures for the exit Emden (i.e., EPT1 
n. 202 and NPT n. 203), such values has been split using the ratio for Gasunie DTS and 
Gasunie TS from the ENTSOG map for 2011. 
The interconnection Estonia – Russia at Narva (n. 225) has been fixed to its maximum 
theoretical capacity for the year 2009. The interconnection Latvia – Russia at Korneti (n. 
212) has been fixed for 2009 to the same value used for 2014 for the export to Russia. 
The reverse flow in Gorizia – Šempeter (n. 29) or in Negru Voda I (n. 53) have not been 
considered as the first was activated at the end of 2014, and the second was only 
technically available on the Bulgarian side at the end of 2014. 
The interconnection between Slovakia and Hungary at Balassagyarmat – Veľké Zlievce 
(constructed with a bidirectional design) was not operational in 2014 and it was not 
accounted for. 
The interconnection between Slovakia and Ukraine at Budince started operations in 
October 2014. The export to Ukraine was estimated in 17,6 Mcm/d based on the values 
of firm capacity published by the TSO from October to December 2014. 
All improvements in the Netherlands to the high pressure grid did not turn out in an 
increase of firm capacity – mainly – with Germany.  
                                           
14 Available at http://www.entsog.eu/maps/transmission-capacity-map 
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ANNEX 3 
The following tables provide the reference data used to create the feature data set used 
to model each national gas system for each scenario. 
The variable PROD, LNG and STO are set to zero in order to start all simulation with the 
same condition and to help the comparison of results by focusing the analysis on 
maximum technical capacities. 
It should be noted that the new LNG terminal of Klapédia (Lithuania) has not been taken 
into account in the simulations because it started commercial operations in January 
2015. 
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Data for the 30 days crisis for 2009 
 
COUNTRY Cons 
Min. 
Cons 
PROD 
Max. 
PROD 
LNG 
Max. 
LNG 
STO 
Max. 
STO 
STO 
Inventory 
STO Max. 
Inventory 
Austria 40.3 40.3 0 4.3 0 0.0 0 48.9 2961.0 4230.0 
Belgium 71.1 71.1 0 0.0 0 28.6 0 22.8 478.8 684.0 
Bulgaria 14.2 14.2 0 0.2 0 0.0 0 3.3 245.0 350.0 
Czech Rep. 45.5 45.5 0 0.4 0 0.0 0 50.7 2153.9 3077.0 
Denmark 21.8 21.8 0 23.2 0 0.0 0 15.7 700.7 1001.0 
Estonia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 18.8 18.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 232.7 232.7 0 2.5 0 46.2 0 328.5 8578.5 12255.0 
Germany 438.3 438.3 0 42.2 0 0.0 0 507.5 14562.8 20804.0 
Greece 11.8 11.8 0 0.0 0 8.7 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 59.4 59.4 0 7.2 0 0.0 0 51.0 2604.0 3720.0 
Ireland 18.3 18.3 0 2.4 0 0.0 0 2.6 161.0 230.0 
Italy 348.0 348.0 0 21.5 0 7.4 0 253.0 10034.5 14335.0 
Latvia 8.9 8.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 24.0 1624.0 2320.0 
Lithuania 14.6 14.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Luxemburg 5.1 5.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 236.4 236.4 0 265.2 0 0.0 0 177.2 3554.6 5078.0 
Poland 71.1 71.1 0 13.2 0 0.0 0 33.8 1102.5 1575.0 
Portugal 12.3 12.3 0 0.0 0 15.1 0 7.0 105.0 150.0 
Romania 48.7 48.7 0 23.6 0 0.0 0 25.1 1885.8 2694.0 
Slovakia 34.3 34.3 0 0.5 0 0.0 0 34.4 1925.0 2750.0 
Slovenia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain 109.0 109.0 0 0.6 0 111.1 0 14.8 1942.5 2775.0 
Sweden 7.0 7.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 1.0 6.0 8.5 
Switzerland 17.5 17.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom 403.5 403.5 0 203.2 0 81.7 0 77.6 2835.7 4051.0 
Bosnia 1.5 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Serbia 10.0 10.0 0 0.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 9.5 9.5 0 5.4 0 0.0 0 5.8 387.1 553.0 
FYROM 0.6 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Data for the 30 days crisis for 2014 
 
COUNTRY Cons 
Min. 
Cons 
PROD 
Max. 
PROD 
LNG 
Max. 
LNG 
STO 
Max. 
STO 
STO 
Inventory 
STO Max. 
Inventory 
Austria 40.3 40.3 0 3.6 0 0.0 0 94.4 5716.2 8166.0 
Belgium 71.1 71.1 0 0.0 0 28.6 0 15.0 490.0 700.0 
Bulgaria 14.2 14.2 0 0.7 0 0.0 0 4.2 385.0 550.0 
Czech Rep. 45.5 45.5 0 0.5 0 0.0 0 57.4 2447.9 3497.0 
Denmark 21.8 21.8 0 18.2 0 0.0 0 16.2 698.6 998.0 
Estonia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 18.8 18.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 232.7 232.7 0 1.5 0 65.7 0 347.0 9075.5 12965.0 
Germany 438.3 438.3 0 31.0 0 0.0 0 643.2 16696.4 23852.0 
Greece 11.8 11.8 0 0.0 0 8.7 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 59.4 59.4 0 5.1 0 0.0 0 80.1 4431.0 6330.0 
Ireland 18.3 18.3 0 1.9 0 0.0 0 2.6 161.0 230.0 
Italy 348.0 348.0 0 16.4 0 35.6 0 290.5 11630.5 16615.0 
Latvia 8.9 8.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 24.0 1624.0 2320.0 
Lithuania 14.6 14.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Luxemburg 5.1 5.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 236.4 236.4 0 280.3 0 27.7 0 220.4 3764.6 5378.0 
Poland 71.1 71.1 0 12.9 0 0.0 0 43.5 1766.8 2524.0 
Portugal 12.3 12.3 0 0.0 0 22.7 0 7.1 167.3 239.0 
Romania 48.7 48.7 0 22.9 0 0.0 0 24.3 2170.0 3100.0 
Slovakia 34.3 34.3 0 0.2 0 0.0 0 45.1 2194.5 3135.0 
Slovenia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain 109.0 109.0 0 0.1 0 115.3 0 31.5 2872.1 4103.0 
Sweden 7.0 7.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 1.0 6.0 8.5 
Switzerland 17.5 17.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom 403.5 403.5 0 124.7 0 116.0 0 108.2 3389.4 4842.0 
Bosnia 1.5 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Serbia 10.0 10.0 0 1.0 0 0.0 0 5.0 315.0 450.0 
Croatia 9.5 9.5 0 5.2 0 0.0 0 5.8 387.1 553.0 
FYROM 0.6 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Data for the 90 days crisis for 2009 
 
COUNTRY Cons 
Min. 
Cons 
PROD 
Max. 
PROD 
LNG 
Max. 
LNG 
STO 
Max. 
STO 
STO 
Inventory 
STO Max. 
Inventory 
Austria 35.7 35.7 0 6.1 0 0.0 0 48.9 2961.0 4230.0 
Belgium 65.5 65.5 0 0.0 0 28.6 0 12.0 478.8 684.0 
Bulgaria 14.2 14.2 0 0.3 0 0.0 0 3.3 245.0 350.0 
Czech Rep. 39.8 39.8 0 0.6 0 0.0 0 50.7 2153.9 3077.0 
Denmark 20.2 20.2 0 33.2 0 0.0 0 15.7 700.7 1001.0 
Estonia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 17.5 13.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 211.3 211.3 0 3.6 0 46.2 0 328.5 8578.5 12255.0 
Germany 393.3 393.3 0 60.4 0 0.0 0 509.9 14562.8 20804.0 
Greece 11.2 11.2 0 0.1 0 8.7 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 52.3 52.3 0 10.3 0 0.0 0 51.0 2604.0 3720.0 
Ireland 17.8 17.8 0 3.5 0 0.0 0 2.5 152.6 218.0 
Italy 320.7 320.7 0 30.7 0 25.9 0 253.0 10034.5 14335.0 
Latvia 8.9 8.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 24.0 1624.0 2320.0 
Lithuania 14.6 14.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Luxemburg 4.8 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 193.2 193.2 0 378.9 0 0.0 0 146.0 3500.0 5000.0 
Poland 63.6 63.6 0 18.8 0 0.0 0 33.8 1102.5 1575.0 
Portugal 11.9 11.9 0 0.0 0 15.1 0 7.0 105.0 150.0 
Romania 48.7 48.7 0 33.7 0 0.0 0 25.1 1885.8 2694.0 
Slovakia 29.2 29.2 0 0.7 0 0.0 0 34.4 1925.0 2750.0 
Slovenia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain 104.9 104.9 0 0.8 0 111.1 0 14.8 1942.5 2775.0 
Sweden 6.4 6.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.6 6.0 8.5 
Switzerland 15.5 15.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom 373.8 373.8 0 290.4 0 99.3 0 77.6 2835.7 4051.0 
Bosnia 1.5 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Serbia 10.0 10.0 0 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Croatia 9.5 9.5 0 7.8 0 0.0 0 5.8 387.1 553.0 
FYROM 0.6 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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Data for the 90 days crisis for 2014 
 
COUNTRY Cons 
Min. 
Cons 
PROD 
Max. 
PROD 
LNG 
Max. 
LNG 
STO 
Max. 
STO 
STO 
Inventory 
STO Max. 
Inventory 
Austria 35.7 35.7 0 5.1 0 0.0 0 94.4 5716.2 8166.0 
Belgium 65.5 65.5 0 0.0 0 28.6 0 15.0 490.0 700.0 
Bulgaria 14.2 14.2 0 1.0 0 0.0 0 4.2 385.0 550.0 
Czech Rep. 39.8 39.8 0 0.7 0 0.0 0 57.4 2447.9 3497.0 
Denmark 20.2 20.2 0 26.0 0 0.0 0 16.2 698.6 998.0 
Estonia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Finland 17.5 17.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
France 211.3 211.3 0 2.1 0 65.7 0 347.0 9075.5 12965.0 
Germany 393.3 393.3 0 44.4 0 0.0 0 643.2 16696.4 23852.0 
Greece 11.2 11.2 0 0.0 0 8.7 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Hungary 52.3 52.3 0 7.2 0 0.0 0 80.1 4431.0 6330.0 
Ireland 17.8 17.8 0 2.7 0 0.0 0 2.6 161.0 230.0 
Italy 320.7 320.7 0 23.5 0 35.6 0 290.5 11630.5 16615.0 
Latvia 8.9 8.9 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 24.0 1624.0 2320.0 
Lithuania 14.6 14.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Luxemburg 4.8 4.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Netherlands 193.2 193.2 0 400.4 0 27.7 0 220.4 3764.6 5378.0 
Poland 63.6 63.6 0 18.5 0 0.0 0 43.5 1766.8 2524.0 
Portugal 11.9 11.9 0 0.0 0 22.7 0 7.1 167.3 239.0 
Romania 48.7 48.7 0 32.8 0 0.0 0 24.3 2170.0 3100.0 
Slovakia 29.2 29.2 0 0.3 0 0.0 0 45.1 2194.5 3135.0 
Slovenia 3.6 3.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Spain 104.9 104.9 0 0.2 0 115.3 0 31.5 2872.1 4103.0 
Sweden 6.4 6.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 1.0 6.0 8.5 
Switzerland 15.5 15.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
United 
Kingdom 373.8 373.8 0 178.1 0 116.0 0 108.2 3389.4 4842.0 
Bosnia 1.5 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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FYROM 0.6 0.6 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
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